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ABSTRACT
Patent law’s “willful infringement” analysis under 35
U.S.C. § 284 and the “exceptional case” analysis under 35
U.S.C. § 285 are largely considered parallel, and
essentially identical. In 2014, the Supreme Court of the
United States drastically changed the standards for the §
285 exceptional case analysis in its Octane Fitness, LLC v.
ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. and Highmark Inc. v. Allcare
Health Management System, Inc. decisions. This prompted
two federal circuit judges to call for similar changes to the
§ 284 willful infringement analysis. On October 19, 2015,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review whether
such a change is warranted. This Article examines the legal
and policy arguments on both sides and concludes that,
while a drastic change of the substantive standard of the
willful infringement analysis is unlikely, a change of the
standard of review is possible. Consequently, the parallel
between § 284 willfulness and § 285 exceptional case
analysis will likely come to an end.
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INTRODUCTION
Section 284 of the U.S. Patent Act grants federal judges the
discretion to enhance damages up to three times the amount found
by a jury or assessed by a court in patent infringement actions.1
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has established
that “an award of enhanced damages [under § 284] requires a
showing of willful infringement.”2 Section 285 of the Patent Act
allows a court to award attorney fees to the prevailing party “in
exceptional cases.”3 The analyses used in these two areas of law
have long been considered parallel and at times even identical.
In Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc., a panel of
judges from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal District
upheld a decision denying enhanced damages based on the
determination that the defendant’s infringement was not willful
under 35 U.S.C. § 284.4 Significantly, two judges concurred and
urged the full court to reconsider the current willfulness standard in
light of the Supreme Court’s 2014 decisions in Octane Fitness,
LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. and Highmark Inc. v. Allcare
Health Management System, Inc.5
The Halo concurrence argues that the Octane Fitness and
Highmark decisions mandate a change of the current willfulness
jurisprudence.6 In Octane Fitness, the Supreme Court overruled the
Federal Circuit’s objective/subjective two-prong test for

1
2

banc).
3

35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012).
In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en

35 U.S.C. § 285 (1952).
Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 769 F.3d 1371, 1381–83 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (relying on the objective/subjective two-prong test set out in In re Seagate
Tech., LLC., 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007), and Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc.
v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 682 F.3d 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2012)), reh’g denied,
780 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 356 (2015).
5
Halo Elecs., 769 F.3d at 1383–86 (citing Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON
Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014) and Highmark Inc. v. Allcare
Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014)).
6
Halo Elecs., 769 F.3d at 1384.
4
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determining an “exceptional case” under 35 U.S.C. § 285.7 The
concurrence points out that the § 284 willfulness analysis entails a
two-prong test that closely mirrors the now-overruled
objective/subjective test for a § 285 “exceptional case.” However,
the circuit court denied the petition for an en banc hearing.8
On October 19, 2015, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
review whether the 2014 decisions on § 285 exceptional cases
warrant a similar change to the § 284 willfulness analysis.9 The
case has been consolidated with Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc. to
further consider (1) whether it is appropriate to predicate an award
of enhanced damages on a finding of willfulness, and (2) whether
the Federal Circuit should apply the abuse of discretion standard
instead of the current de novo standard when reviewing § 284
enhanced damages determinations.10
This Article examines the legal arguments and the underlying
policy implications of the upcoming Supreme Court review, and
concludes that the possibility of a drastic change to the substantive
standard of § 284 willfulness is rather low. It is true that the
histories of § 284 willfulness and § 285 exceptional case present
similar and paralleled patterns of development, and that many
Supreme Court criticisms of the Federal Circuit’s pre-Octane §
285 jurisprudence apply equally to the current § 284 framework.
However, § 284 and § 285 are distinct areas of patent law, serving
very different policy purposes, and therefore warrant different
treatment. Most importantly, a drastic change of the current § 284
willfulness analysis will directly contradict the current initiative to
counter the impact of so-called “patent trolls” on national patent
enforcement trends. Consequently, although a change of the
standard of review remains possible, a drastic change of the
substantive standard of § 284 jurisprudence is unlikely.
7

Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749,
1757–58 (2014).
8
Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 780 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (per
curiam) [hereinafter Halo Rehearing Denial Order].
9
Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 356 (2015).
10
Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc., 774 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2014),
withdrawn and replaced by Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc., 782 F.3d 649 (Fed.
Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 356 (2015).
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I. THE HISTORICAL PARALLEL BETWEEN § 284 WILLFULNESS AND §
285 EXCEPTIONAL CASE ANALYSIS
Arguments for changing the current § 284 willfulness analysis
largely hinge on the historical parallel between the jurisprudence
of § 284 willfulness and § 285 exceptional case analysis.11 Thus,
an examination of the evolving histories of both sets of cases is
instructive for further analysis.
A. Section 285 Exceptional Case Jurisprudence
Section 285 of the U.S. Patent Act provides that, in the context
of patent infringement actions, “[t]he court in exceptional cases
may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”12
Before the creation of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, regional courts applied § 285 “in a discretionary manner,
assessing various factors to determine whether a given case was
sufficiently ‘exceptional’ to warrant a fee award.”13 For over two
decades, the Federal Circuit followed this approach and instructed
district courts to consider the “totality of the circumstances” when
making an exceptional case determination.14
In 2005, the Federal Circuit radically changed course in Brooks
Furniture Manufacturing, Inc. v. Dutailier International, Inc.,
11

See Halo Rehearing Denial Order, 780 F.3d at 1361 (Judge O’Malley
argues in his dissent that the two-prong test in §284 willful infringement
jurisprudence is “analogous” to, and “has closely mirrored,” jurisprudence
governing §285 exceptional cases).
12
35 U.S.C. § 285 (1952).
13
Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749,
1753–54 (2014) (citing True Temper Corp. v. CF&I Steel Corp., 601 F.2d 495,
508–09 (10th Cir. 1979); Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Giddings & Lewis, Inc.,
452 F.2d 579, 597 (7th Cir. 1971); Siebring v. Hansen, 346 F.2d 474, 480–81
(8th Cir. 1965)).
14
See, e.g., Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 688, 691
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (“Cases decided under § 285 have noted that the substitution of
the phrase in exceptional cases has not done away with the discretionary
feature.”) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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applying a test that narrows the scope of analysis.15 Under Brooks
Furniture, a case is “exceptional” under § 285 only “when there
has been some material inappropriate conduct related to the matter
in litigation, such as willful infringement, fraud or inequitable
conduct in procuring the patent, misconduct during litigation,
vexatious or unjustified litigation, conduct that violates Fed. R.
Civ. P. 11, or like infractions.”16 Citing the Supreme Court’s
decision in Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia
Picture Industries, Inc. (“PRE”), the Federal Circuit held that
“[a]bsent misconduct in conduct of the litigation or in securing the
patent, sanctions may be imposed against the patentee only if both
(1) the litigation is brought in subjective bad faith, and (2) the
litigation is objectively baseless.”17 Courts typically refer to this
two-part inquiry as the objective/subjective test. Further,
exceptional cases must be established by clear and convincing
evidence.18
On April 29, 2014, the Supreme Court overruled the Brooks
Furniture standard for § 285 exceptional cases in Octane Fitness
and Highmark.19 In Octane Fitness, the Court criticized the
objective/subjective test as “overly rigid” and “so demanding that
it would appear to render § 285 largely superfluous.”20 The Court
noted that the Federal Circuit imported its narrow exception for
sham litigation, despite the fact that it “finds no roots in the
[statutory] text of § 285.”21 The Court went on to point out that the
only constraint on a court’s discretion in assigning attorney fees

15

Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378 (Fed.
Cir. 2005), abrogated by Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc.,
134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014).
16
Brooks Furniture, 393 F.3d at 1381.
17
Id. (citing Prof’l Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Picture Indus., Inc.,
508 U.S. 49, 56, 60–61 (1993) (holding that, within the meaning of the “sham
exception” to Noerr doctrine immunity from antitrust liability, a lawsuit must be
objectively baseless)).
18
Brooks Furniture, 393 F.3d at 1382.
19
Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1749 (2014); Highmark Inc. v. Allcare
Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014).
20
Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1756, 1758.
21
Id. at 1757.
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under § 285 is that the case has to be “exceptional.”22 “[A]n
‘exceptional’ case is simply one that stands out from others with
respect to the substantive strength of a party’s litigating position
(considering both the governing law and the facts of the case) or
unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated.”23 As a
result, “[d]istrict courts may determine whether a case is
‘exceptional’ in the case-by-case exercise of their discretion,
considering the totality of the circumstances.”24 The Court also
held that the evidentiary burden of establishing an exceptional case
requires only a preponderance of the evidence, rather than the
more difficult clear and convincing standard.25 In Highmark, the
Court established that, on appeal, an abuse of discretion standard—
rather than a de novo standard—should be applied when
“reviewing all aspects of a district court’s § 285 determination.”26
B. Section 284 Willfulness Jurisprudence
Section 284 of the Patent Act reads: “[T]he court may increase
the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed.”27
The current statutory language and its previous versions do not
impose a specific standard for awarding enhanced damages, but
early courts read a “willfulness” requirement into it.28
Shortly after its establishment, the Federal Circuit adopted an
affirmative duty of due care standard for determining willfulness in
Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co.29 Specifically,
22

Id. at 1755–56.
Id. at 1756.
24
Id.
25
Id. at 1758.
26
Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1749
(2014).
27
35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012).
28
See Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. 480, 488 (1853) (suggesting that a
discretionary increase in damages under the 1836 Act should be reserved only
for “the wanton and malicious pirate”); Union Carbide Corp. v. Graver Tank &
Mfg. Co., 282 F.2d 653, 663 (7th Cir. 1960) (holding that increased damages are
for “conscious and wilful [sic] infringer”); Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top
Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 508 (1964) (noting that increased damages are
only available “in a case of willful or bad-faith infringement”).
29
Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380,
23
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the Federal Circuit explained that “[w]here . . . a potential infringer
has actual notice of another’s patent rights, he has an affirmative
duty to exercise due care to determine whether or not he is
infringing.”30 This includes “the duty to seek and obtain competent
legal advice from counsel before the initiation of any possible
infringing activities.”31 The court further announced that willful
infringement would be based on the “totality of the circumstances
presented.”32
Underwater Devices and its progeny “set[ ] a lower threshold
for willful infringement that is more akin to negligence.”33 This
development resulted in enhanced damages being regularly
awarded in patent cases. In a study conducted from 1983 to 2000,
willfulness was found in 67.7% of jury trials and in 52.6% of
bench trials.34 Furthermore, enhanced damages were imposed 95%
of the time when a judge found willfulness, and 63% of the time
when a jury found willfulness.35 Underwater Devices’ progeny
made it the subject of continuing criticism from academics and
litigators.36
In 2007, the Federal Circuit unanimously overruled the
“affirmative duty of due care” standard in In re Seagate Tech.,
LLC.37 In Seagate, the Federal Circuit referenced the Supreme
Court’s Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Burr decision, and developed
1389–90 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The Federal Circuit was established in 1982 through
the Federal Courts Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 50 (1982).
30
Underwater Devices, 717 F.2d at 1389–90.
31
Id. at 1390 (emphasis added).
32
Id.
33
In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
34
Kimberly A. Moore, Empirical Statistics on Willful Patent Infringement,
14 FED. CIR. B.J. 227, 237 (2004–2005) [hereinafter Willful Patent
Infringement].
35
Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—An Empirical
Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 394 (2000) [hereinafter
Judges, Juries and Patent Cases].
36
See William F. Lee et al., The Doctrine of Willful Patent Infringement
After Knorr-Bremse: Practical Problems & Recommendations, 7 SEDONA CONF.
J. 169 (2006); Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV.
123, 143 (2006) (noting that the current “willfulness doctrine . . . creates a huge
barrier to the effective operation of the patent system’s disclosure function”).
37
In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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a two-prong test for establishing willful infringement. This test
requires (1) an objective inquiry into whether the defendant acted
despite a high likelihood that his or her actions would infringe a
valid patent, and (2) a subjective inquiry into whether the
defendant knew or should have known that he or she was engaged
in objective risk of infringing a valid patent.38 Seagate also shifted
the burden of proof for establishing willfulness back to the
patentee and raised the evidentiary burden to “clear and convincing
evidence.”39 The Federal Circuit subsequently ruled that the
objective prong of the test is a question of law, and thus is subject
to de novo review.40 These holdings remain controlling today.
II. THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN § 284 WILLFULNESS AND PRE-OCTANE
§ 285 EXCEPTIONAL CASE ANALYSIS
Seagate’s two-prong test for willfulness is strikingly similar to
the pre-Octane test for exceptional cases in terms of formality.
Both tests require a showing that the accused’s actions are likely to
be deemed objectively wrongful,41 and a showing of subjective bad
faith.42 Furthermore, the dissent in the Halo Rehearing Denial
Order appeared to suggest that the § 284 willfulness standard and
the pre-Octane § 285 exceptional case standard both rely on the
Supreme Court’s ruling in PRE, and therefore share common case
law roots.43
38

Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371 (citing Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551
U.S. 47, 57–60 (2007) (holding that when a statute leaves the standard of
willfulness undefined, the common law’s objective recklessness standard should
be applied)).
39
Id.
40
Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 682 F.3d
1003, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
41
The Seagate willfulness analysis requires a patentee to show an
objectively high likelihood that the infringer’s actions constituted infringement.
The pre-Octane exception case analysis requires the prevailing party to establish
that the litigation is objectively baseless.
42
The pre-Octane exceptional case analysis requires a showing of
“subjective bad faith,” while the Seagate willfulness analysis requires a showing
that the infringer acted despite knowledge that his or her action was highly
likely to be wrongful.
43
Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 780 F.3d 1357, 1361–62 (Fed. Cir.
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Closer examination suggests that the interplay between § 284
willfulness and pre-Octane § 285 exceptional case analysis goes
beyond formalistic similarities and historical connections. In the
seven years between Seagate and Octane Fitness, courts treated the
two areas of law as inseparable, and even identical, in practice.
Even the Federal Circuit has commented that the § 284 willfulness
and the § 285 exceptional case standards are “parallel” or
“identical” to each other.44 In cases where the patentee prevailed
under a § 285 exceptional case analysis, a finding of willful
infringement alone can be sufficient to declare a case
exceptional.45 In other cases, the Federal Circuit makes no
distinction between the two areas of law, citing cases from one
area as precedents for the other.46 Commentators were quick to
2015) (O’Malley, J., dissenting) (per curiam) (“Indeed, the structure for
assessing willfulness set forth in Bard and our old § 285 Brooks Furniture test
were both predicated on our interpretation of the Supreme Court’s decision
Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc.
(“PRE”), 508 U.S. 49 (1993), which we believed required a two-step
objective/subjective inquiry before either enhanced damages or attorneys’ fees
could be awarded.”).
44
Bard, 682 F.3d at 1007 (“Our holding is consistent with similar holdings
in other parallel areas of law. Our precedent regarding objectively baseless
claims, which allow courts to award enhanced damages and attorneys’ fees
under 35 U.S.C. § 285, and the Supreme Court’s precedent on ‘sham’ litigation
are instructive.”); iLOR, LLC v. Google, Inc., 631 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (“The objective baselessness standard for enhanced damages and
attorneys’ fees against a non-prevailing plaintiff under Brooks Furniture is
identical to the objective recklessness standard for enhanced damages and
attorneys’ fees against an accused infringer for § 284 willful infringement
actions under [Seagate].”).
45
See, e.g., Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 F.3d 1354,
1373–74 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (affirming award of attorneys’ fees after ruling district
court did not err in finding that the infringement was willful and infringer did
not challenge the fee award on any substantive bases other than the alleged error
in the finding of willful infringement); Golight, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
355 F.3d 1327, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Based on a finding of willful
infringement, it is within the district court’s discretion whether to award attorney
fees under § 285.”); Avia Grp. Int’l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear Cal., Inc., 853 F.2d 1557,
1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“[T]he willfulness of the infringement provided a
sufficient basis for a section 285 attorney fee award to the prevailing patent
owner.”).
46
See, e.g., Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 701 F.3d
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point out that the Federal Circuit “has practically equated a finding
of willfulness with a finding that a case is exceptional.”47
Due to the common and overlapping elements between the two
areas of law, the Supreme Court’s criticisms of the Federal
Circuit’s pre-Octane § 285 exceptional case analysis can arguably
apply to the current § 284 willfulness analysis. First, similar to the
pre-Octane § 285 jurisprudence, the Federal Circuit’s reading of
the objective/subjective test and its inclusion of the word
“willfulness” in § 284 jurisprudence did not have any “roots in the
[statutory] text,” but rather was “imported” from Supreme Court
case law.48 Second, the objective/subjective test under § 284 is just
as “overly rigid” as the now-overturned Brooks Furniture test.49
Lastly, the de novo standard of review that applies in the objective
prong of the Seagate willfulness test appears to be incompatible
with the discretion allowed in a § 284 enhanced damages
determination.
III. THE ARGUMENTS FOR MAINTAINING THE CURRENT § 284
WILLFUL INFRINGEMENT JURISPRUDENCE
At first glance, arguments for changing the current § 284
willfulness standard have some merit. However, several reasons
support maintaining it.
A. Section 284 Enhancement Focuses on Commercial Behavior
While § 285 Focuses on Litigation Expenses
Enhanced damages serve to penalize and deter unethical

1351 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (holding that objective prong of § 285
exceptional case should be reviewed de novo by citing Bard Peripheral
Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 682 F.3d 1003, 1005 (Fed. Cir.
2012) which held that the objective prong of § 284 willfulness analysis is
subject to de novo review), overruled by 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014).
47
Debra Koker, Fulfilling the “Due Care” Requirement After KnorrBremse, 11 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 154, 157 (2005).
48
Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749,
1752, 1757 (2014).
49
Id. at 1756.
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“commercial behavior.”50 As the Federal Circuit explains, “[t]he
rules of patent infringement are rules of business ethics, and
require prudent commercial actions in accordance with law. . . . 35
U.S.C. § 284 provides [a] remedy to the patentee when these
standards are not met, up to three times the amount of found or
assessed damages.”51 Thus, an award of enhanced damages seeks
to deter unacceptable business behavior, such as deliberately
copying a patented invention without performing an analysis as to
the legality of the copying. But lawful practices of competition,
including studying a competitor’s patents and designing around
these patents, are permissible.52 The focus is solely on the alleged
infringer’s behavior in the marketplace—behavior during litigation
is irrelevant.
By contrast, § 285’s fee-shifting targets improper litigation
behavior, and thereby serves a different purpose from enhanced
damages under § 284. The fees awarded under § 285 serve to
reimburse a party for legal expenses incurred from participating in
an exceptional case. For example, it can reimburse a party who is
impacted by bad faith litigation tactics.53 The fees awarded are not
tied to the value of the technology or any party’s market behavior,
but rather to the cost of the litigation itself.
Furthermore, courts have noted that § 284’s enhanced damages
and § 285’s fee-shifting are different in nature. Cases suggest that
by fulfilling their deterrent purpose, § 284’s treble damages are
punitive.54 By contrast, the fees awarded under § 285 are
50

4 ROBERT A. MATTHEWS, ANNOTATED PATENT DIGEST § 31:1 (2015).
Vulcan Eng’g Co., v. Fata Aluminium, Inc., 278 F.3d 1366, 1378 (Fed.
Cir. 2002); see also Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chems. Ltd., 78 F.3d 1575,
1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“The issue of ‘willful’ infringement measures the
infringing behavior, in circumstances in which the infringer acted against an
objective standard of reasonable commercial behavior in the same
circumstances.”).
52
MATTHEWS, supra note 50, at § 31:1.
53
5 ROBERT A. MATTHEWS, ANNOTATED PATENT DIGEST § 33:1 (2015);
see also Mathis v. Spears, 857 F.2d 749, 753(Fed. Cir. 1988) (“The purpose of
Section 285 is to reimburse a party injured when forced to undergo an
‘exceptional’ case.”).
54
See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 507 (2008) (listing
Section 284 among punitive damages statutes); Root v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry.
Co., 105 U.S. 189, 196 (1881) (“[T]he Patent Act of 1836 . . . leav[es] it to the
51
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compensatory, not punitive, even when they are based on a finding
of willful infringement.55 The Supreme Court has held that “in our
judicial system[,] compensatory and punitive damages, although
usually awarded at the same time by the same decision maker,
serve different purposes,” and thus should entail different
standards.56
B. Section 284 Willfulness and Pre-Octane § 285 Exceptional
Cases Developed Independently Through Case Law
One argument for changing the current § 284 willfulness
standard relies on the premise that “[the Federal Circuit’s]
willfulness test, as described in Seagate and Bard, and [its] old §
285 test, under Brooks Furniture, were predicated on [the Court’s]
interpretation of the Supreme Court’s decision in Professional Real
Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. (“PRE”),
508 U.S. 49 (1993).”57 Following this premise, the Federal Circuit
should reconsider whether there is any justification for using the
narrow PRE standard in analyzing § 284 willfulness, since its
reliance on PRE in § 285 exceptional case analysis has been

discretion of the court to inflict punitive damages to the extent of trebling the
verdict.”); SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Advanced Tech. Labs., Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1468
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (“When willful infringement or bad faith has been found, the
remedy of enhancement of damages not only serve its primary punitive/deterrent
role, but in so doing it has the secondary benefit of quantifying the equities as
between patentee and infringer.”); Delta-X Corp. v. Baker Hughes Prod. Tools,
Inc., 984 F.2d 410, 413 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“Enhanced damages are punitive, not
compensatory.”).
55
Knorr-Bremse Sys. Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d
1337, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“The appellants also argue that the award of
attorney fees is a matter of punitive damages, and is therefore improper.
Precedent and statute do not support this position . . . and the court has
confirmed that a finding of willful infringement may qualify a case as
exceptional under § 285. That there were not actual damages does not render the
award of attorney fees punitive.”).
56
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003)
(internal citation omitted).
57
Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 769 F.3d 1371, 1384 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (O’Malley, J., concurring).
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rejected.58
However, a close reading of the respective histories of § 284
and § 285 reveals a different picture. In fact, the two areas of law
were largely developed through independent and unrelated lines of
authority. In Seagate, the Federal Circuit established the
objective/subjective test without mentioning PRE at all. 59 Instead,
the Federal Circuit looked to several Supreme Court decisions and
essentially adopted the well-established meaning of “willfulness”
from other civil contexts.60 In Bard, the Federal Circuit in no way
relied on PRE, but merely referenced the case, recognizing that the
de novo standard of review of the Seagate test “is consistent with
similar holdings in other parallel areas of law,” that is, the preOctane § 285 exceptional cases.61
C. The Parallel and Overlap Between § 284 and § 285
Jurisprudence are Overstated
Fee awards under § 285 may be granted to a prevailing party
regardless of whether it is a prevailing patentee or a prevailing
accused infringer.62 In contrast, § 284’s enhanced damages can
only be applied to alleged infringers. The overlap between § 284
and § 285 jurisprudence only applies to situations where the award
of attorneys’ fees is based on a finding of willful infringement.
On further examination, cases where attorneys’ fees were
awarded after a finding of willfulness under § 285 illustrate how
even the overlap between § 284 willfulness analysis and preOctane § 285 exceptional case analysis can be overstated. A
finding of willful infringement under § 284 may be sufficient for
58

Id. at 1384–85.
See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1370–71 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
60
Id.
61
Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 682 F.3d
1003, 1007 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
62
See, e.g., Brasseler, U.S.A. I, L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp., 267 F.3d 1370
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (affirming summary judgment where attorneys’ fees were
awarded against a patentee); Beckman Instrument, Inc. v. LKB Produkter AB,
892 F.2d 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (affirming award of attorney fees against the
accused infringer).
59

2016]

END OF THE PARALLEL BETWEEN PATENT LAW’S
§ 284 WILLFULNESS AND § 285 EXCEPTIONAL CASE ANALYSIS

325

awarding fees under § 285, but it does not mandate them.63
Moreover, conduct that shows intentional infringement, but falls
short of willful infringement under Seagate, may still support an
award of attorneys’ fees.64
IV. POLICY CONCERNS REVEALED IN THE SUPREME COURT’S RECENT
PATENT CASES SUPPORT THE CURRENT § 284 ANALYSIS
While the legal arguments for changing the § 284 willfulness
analysis and the arguments against doing so appear to be equally
strong, policy arguments tilt the scale in favor of maintaining §
284’s current substantive standard with an adjustment of its
standard of review.
A. The Supreme Court’s Heightened Interest in Patent Law
The Supreme Court’s interest in patent cases has been rising in
recent years.65 The Court’s decisions reflect two predominant
policy themes: (1) an interest in moving patent law back to the
mainstream of general civil law, and (2) an increasingly skeptical
attitude towards the Federal Circuit’s pro-patent stance.
The Supreme Court’s paradigmatic role is to harmonize the
application of federal law across the country, particularly on
jurisdictional or procedural questions. Recently the Supreme Court
rejected patent-specific procedures as sanctioned by the Federal
63

See, e.g., Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1460 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (en banc) (ruling that it was proper for the trial court not to declare
the case exceptional despite the jury verdict of willful infringement); Mentor
H/S, Inc. v. Med. Device Alliance, Inc., 244 F.3d 1365, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(affirming the district court’s decision not to award attorney fees even though
the jury found willful infringement).
64
See, e.g., Kleen-Tex Indus. Inc. v. Mountville Mills, Inc., No. 3:03-CV093-JTC, 2008 WL 2486363, at *18–19 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 28, 2008).
65
James R. Barney & Jason W. Melvin, The Supreme Court Shows
Unprecedented Interest in IP Issues, FINNEGAN (July 17, 2014),
http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news=4a125f5a4d15-4f90-81fd-99e16212570c. For example, the Supreme Court only took on
one patent case in 1980, whereas the Court heard an unprecedented six patent
cases 2013.
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Circuit, bringing them back in line with mainstream jurisprudence
in other civil contexts. In eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., the
Court made it clear that the availability of injunctive relief in
patent cases should be no different from its availability in other
areas of law.66 In MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., the Court
relied on its broader declaratory judgment jurisprudence to reject
the Federal Circuit’s patent-specific standard.67 In Teva
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., the Court sternly
criticized the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence in claim constructions
and stated that “we did not create an exception from the ordinary
rule governing appellate review of factual matters.”68
Recent case law indicates that the Court is also acting to
combat the Federal Circuit’s alleged pro-patent bias. For example,
in Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., the Court gave
powerful ammunition to companies seeking to invalidate patents
by heightening the definiteness requirement under 35 U.S.C. §
112.69 In Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Technologies, Inc.,
the Court made induced infringement harder to prove by holding
that there can be no induced infringement without an act of
underlying direct infringement.70 In Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank
International, the Court substantially heightened the bar for § 101
patent eligibility in order to root out abstract patents.71 Scholars
have long recognized that the Supreme Court’s patent law
jurisprudence swings like a pendulum between pro-patent and antipatent stances.72 Many suspect that the recent shift from pro-patent
to anti-patent was triggered by its concern over patent trolls.73 The
Court explicitly acknowledged this concern for the first time in its
recent decision, Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc.74
66

eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391–93 (2006).
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 128–34 (2007).
68
Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 838 (2015).
69
Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014).
70
Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014).
71
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
72
DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 5 (2015).
73
Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Litigation Reform: The Courts, Congress, and
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 95 B.U. L. Rev. 279 (2015).
74
Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1930 (2015)
(“The Court is well aware that an ‘industry has developed in which firms use
67
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B. Both Octane Fitness and Highmark Reflect the Court’s
Concerns Over Patent-Exceptionalism and Pro-Patent Bias
The Supreme Court’s Octane and Highmark decisions on § 285
exceptional case analysis comport with the concerns for both
patent exceptionalism and pro-patent bias. In Octane Fitness, the
Supreme Court brought the evidentiary burden of proving the
exceptional case standard back to a preponderance of the
evidence—the “standard generally applicable in civil actions.”75
Furthermore, in Highmark, the Supreme Court switched the
standard of review for § 285’s fee-shifting back to an abuse of
discretion—the traditional standard for matters of discretion.76
Once again, the Supreme Court knocked down one of the Federal
Circuit’s patent-specific rules bringing the jurisprudence back to
mainstream civil law.
On the other hand, by abandoning the rigid Brooks Furniture
test for finding an exceptional case, the Supreme Court gave
companies incentives to incur the cost of litigating with the hope of
winning back their fees and essentially signaled that lower courts
should discourage aggressive suits brought by patent trolls.77 Even
before Octane Fitness, judges and scholars had long championed
the idea of developing § 285’s fee-awarding into an effective tool

patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for
obtaining licensing fees’ . . . it is still necessary and proper to stress that district
courts have the authority and responsibility to ensure frivolous cases are
dissuaded.” (quoting eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1842
(2006))).
75
OctaneFitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749,
1758 (2014).
76
Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1748–
49 (2014).
77
Ryan Davis, One Year On, Octane Causing More Hard-Fought Patent
Cases, LAW 360 (May 1, 2015 5:00 PM), http://www.law360.com/
articles/648905/one-year-on-octane-causing-more-hard-fought-patent-cases. See
also Commil, 135 S. Ct. at 1930–31 (2015) (“[D]istrict courts have the authority
and responsibility to ensure frivolous cases [brought by trolls] are dissuaded . . .
It is [also] within the district court’s discretion to award attorney’s fees to
prevailing parties in ‘exceptional cases.’”).
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to battle patent trolls.78
C. Maintaining the Current Substantive Standard of § 284, But
Changing the Appellate Review Standard Comports with the
Supreme Court’s Concerns
Drastically lowering the substantive standard of the enhanced
damages of § 284 willfulness analysis—as proposed in the Halo
concurrence—will directly contradict the Supreme Court’s desire
to rein in pro-patent bias and patent troll problems. Unlike § 285’s
double-edged fee-shifting, § 284’s enhanced damages only apply
to alleged infringers. Bringing down the barrier of establishing
willfulness does nothing to deter aggressive suits and frivolous
litigation brought by patent trolls. On the contrary, it provides
patent trolls with more incentives to ramp up their activities.79
Furthermore, abolishing the current two-prong test for establishing
willfulness would pave the path for a patentee to establish an
exceptional case under 35 U.S.C. § 285. Specifically, a patentee
seeking attorneys’ fees under § 285 will have a much easier time
doing so by alleging that the infringement is willful as a result of a
lowered standard. This change would roll back progress made by
the Supreme Court in Octane Fitness and Highmark with respect to
§ 285 exceptional case jurisprudence—an unthinkable scenario
78

Randall R. Rader, Colleen V. Chien & David Hricik, Make Patent Trolls
Pay in Court, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/
opinion/make-patent-trolls-pay-in-court.html?; Emily H. Chen, Making Abusers
Pay: Deterring Patent Litigation by Shifting Attorneys’ Fees, 28 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 351 (2013).
79
Given that an accused infringer must be found liable before invoking
enhanced fees under § 284, and the fact that the majority of patent cases settle
without a determination of liability (whether by trial or motion), it is unlikely
that a change of § 284 standard will lead to a dramatic increase in awards under
§ 284. However, such a change will materially alter the dynamics of the
settlement negotiations, since it increases patentees’ leverage. A lowered
standard for § 284 encourages patentees to pursue enhanced damages more
aggressively, or at least to threaten to do so. An alleged infringer would be
forced to revise his settlement position in response, given that a more credible
threat of § 284 would lead to an increase in both the potential damages award
and the expected litigation cost in defending the case.
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after the Court expressed its concerns in Commil.80
However, switching the standard of review from de novo to
abuse of discretion brings another patent-specific rule back in line
with mainstream civil law jurisprudence. Such a switch would
resolve the inherent tension between the de novo review standard
and the clear and convincing evidentiary standard, as Justice
Breyer pointed out in Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Limited Partnership.81
Furthermore, an abuse of discretion standard does not directly
contradict the Supreme Court’s concern over patent trolls, and
leaves breathing room for Federal Circuit review.82
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s upcoming review of the willful
infringement standard under 35 U.S.C. § 284 for enhanced
damages carries particular significance. Considering its policy
implications on the patent troll problem, the Court is unlikely to
lower the current willfulness standard substantially. However, a
change of its standard of review from de novo to abuse of
discretion remains possible. Consequently, this decision is likely to
end the parallel between § 284 willfulness and § 285 exceptional
case analysis.

80

Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1930 (2015)
(Kennedy, J., majority) (“The Court is well aware that an ‘industry has
developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for producing and selling
goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees.’” (quoting eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1842 (2006))); see also id. at 1932
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is by no means clear that the Court’s holding, which
increases the in terrorem power of patent trolls, is preferable.”).
81
Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2253 (2011) (Breyer,
J., concurring) (noting that the clear and convincing evidentiary standard only
applies to question of fact whereas de novo standard applies to question of law).
82
See Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744,
1748 n.2 (2014) (“A district court would necessarily abuse its discretion if it
based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous
assessment of the evidence.”).
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PRACTICE POINTERS


Oral arguments were conducted on February 23, 2016, for
the consolidated suit between Halo Electronics, Inc. v.
Pulse Electronics, Inc. and Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc.83
Notably, Justice Breyer and Justice Sotomayor seemed to
recognize the necessity of maintaining the relatively high
willfulness requirement currently in force, but also were
receptive to minor adjustments to the substantive standard
to give patentees “some leeway around the edges.”84



Pending the Supreme Court’s decision, the Federal Circuit
will hold in abeyance any requests for en banc review
regarding § 284 enhanced damages.85



Distinguish case law regarding 35 U.S.C. § 284 and 35
U.S.C. § 285 that has been overruled by Octane Fitness
and Highmark, especially where cases in one area reference
cases in the other as precedent or support.

83

Oral Argument Calendars: Session Beginning February 22, 2016,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (Dec. 23, 2015),
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_calendars/MonthlyArg
umentCalFebruary2016.pdf.
84
Transcript of Oral Argument at 10–11, 15, 35–36, Halo Elecs., Inc. v.
Pulse Elecs., Inc., No. 14-1513 (Feb. 23, 2016).
85
Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp., 805 F.3d 1382 (Fed. Cir.
Oct. 19, 2015).

